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Abstract: We discuss the role that intuitive theories of physics play in the interpretation of
quantum mechanics. We compare and contrast naïve physics with quantum mechanics and
argue that quantum mechanics is not just hard to understand but that it is difficult to believe,
often appearing magical in nature. Quantum mechanics is often discussed in the context of
"quantum weirdness" and quantum entanglement is known as "spooky action at a distance."
This spookiness is more than just because quantum mechanics doesn't match everyday
experience; it ruffles the feathers of our naïve physics cognitive module. In Everett's manyworlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, we preserve a form of deterministic thinking that
can alleviate some of the perceived weirdness inherent in other interpretations of quantum
mechanics, at the cost of having the universe split into parallel worlds at every quantum
measurement. By examining the role cognitive modules play in interpreting quantum
mechanics, we conclude that the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics involves a
cognitive bias not seen in the Copenhagen interpretation.
Introduction
Neils Bohr said of quantum mechanics, “Those who are not shocked when they first come
across quantum theory cannot possibly have understood it.” [1] When one first learns about
quantum mechanics, it appears to be a theory that cannot be describing reality. In fact, the
more one learns about it, the more counterintuitive it becomes, seeming supernatural. While
the theory is mathematically elegant and the predictions of the theory have been tested and
verified, there is something about quantum mechanics that just doesn’t feel right. Can the
underlying reality of nature really be so bizarre?
Presently, the two prevailing interpretations of quantum mechanics are the Copenhagen
interpretation, developed by Bohr and Heisenberg in Copenhagen in the 1920s [2], and the
many-worlds interpretation, first proposed by Hugh Everett in 1957 [3]. Whereas the
Copenhagen interpretation explains the surprising outcomes of quantum theory by positing
that nature is inherently non-local, the many-worlds interpretation tries to recover from this
counter-intuitiveness (and the need for a mechanism for wave-function collapse) at the
expense of postulating that the universe is constantly splitting apart at every quantum
interaction in the universe.
1

This paper proposes that the adherence to the many-worlds interpretation is biased by the
human perception of reality arising from an innate understanding of physics. That is, the
Copenhagen interpretation’s non-locality feels wrong and at times mystical, making the manyworlds interpretation more appealing because of our innate cognitive structure.
Cognitive Modules
Since at least the time of Plato and Aristotle, the debate over whether humans are inborn with
inherent knowledge and even a knowledge-processing system has fascinated the world’s
greatest thinkers. While at first these types of arguments were limited primarily to
philosophers, modern research has spurred this discussion into the systems of education and
science, particularly now preoccupying the work of many scholars in the field of cognitive
psychology. While for centuries, philosophers and early psychologists argued between
potential cognitive inheritances from Tabula Rasa to innatism, only in the last half century has
empirical data arisen validating the existence of an inborn psyche.
These predisposed thought structures found common in newborns and very young children,
referred to as a child’s cognitive modules, give them an innate knowledge that allows them to
process new information in certain ways [4]. Research has shown that cognitive modules
appear to be involved in a child’s ability to, amongst other things, process and ascertain
language [5], distinguish the self from others [6], and rely on object permanence [7]. Early
research by Piaget [8] demonstrated how cognitive modules lead people to systematically view
the world in biased ways, an effect called cognitive bias. Cognitive biases may not match reality.
For example, these cognitive biases can cause people to systematically make errors when
interpreting theories of motion [9]. Thus, it seems reasonable to assert that naïve physics,
defined by Proffitt as “the commonsense beliefs that people hold about the way the world
works” [10], may have similarly biased the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Naïve Physics
Research has shown that many core beliefs are solidified in children either at a very young age
or else are entirely inborn. When analyzing intuitive beliefs about motion it has been found that
they have more in common with medieval (Aristotelian) mechanics rather than classical
Newtonian mechanics.
Nersessian and Resnick present the intuitive beliefs about motion as follows [11]:
1. All motion requires a causal explanation.
2. Motion is caused by a “force.”
3. Continuing motion is sustained by a stored “force.”
4. Active and passive motions differ.
5. Downward motion is natural.
6. Heavier objects fall faster.
A child’s inherent belief in a stored force or impetus has been observed in multiple studies,
sometimes even leading to false conclusions. For example, the curvilinear bias is a
misconception where objects constrained to a curved path are assumed to continue to follow a
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curved path once released [12]. Contrary to our innate curvilinear bias, objects released from a
curved path move in a line tangent to the release point rather than continue to follow a curved
path.
Fascinatingly, many facets of naïve physics such as the curvilinear bias are often seen pervading
into adulthood. A curvilinear bias is seen in the misrepresentation of physical properties in the
thriller Wanted where the main characters are capable of sending bullets on curved paths
simply by firing while swinging their arm [13]. Though tantalizing one’s inborn cognitive
disposition, this action defies physics. This Hollywood movie is just one illustration of how
childhood judgements of physical properties can carry on into adulthood. Perhaps even more
fascinating is the fact that even those “trained in physics” often revert back to evaluating via
their cognitive biases if required to answer physics riddles under time pressure [10, 14, 15].
Another famous example of children’s cognitive biases in physics that can mislead has become
known as the gravity error; the error arising from the innate belief that “downward motion is
natural.” Explored by psychologist Bruce Hood, this error comes from children not
understanding that certain laws can modify the law of gravity. Hood found that, when viewing
a ball dropped into one of three holes, young children always look in a pocket directly beneath
the original hole in which the ball was originally dropped. These children did not have to be
trained to do this: they appeared to instinctively know that objects fall straight down. An
interesting twist on the experiment showed that children continue to do so even when a tube is
connected to the mouth of one hole and stretched to a pocket other than the one directly
below. The infants will still look directly beneath the hole in which the ball was dropped and
ignore completely the pocket to which the tube stretches. This makes it seem that infants do
not understand that a curving tube can override the law of gravity [16].
Other examples of these naïve understandings of physics are abundant. When a tennis ball is
thrown into the air, we expect it to come back down. When one object rolls into another, we
expect it to stop or bounce off, not pass right through. Bruce Hood, in his book SuperSense
[17], expounds upon four rules of naïve physics that underlie all physical intuitive reasoning,
proposed by infant psychologist Elizabeth Spelke [18]. These four rules are pivotal in our
discussion of the effect cognitive biases have on theories of quantum mechanics, and as such,
will be quoted below as presented by Hood in his book [17]:
Rule 1: Objects do not go in and out of existence like the Cheshire Cat in Alice in Wonderland.
Their solidity dictates that they are not phantoms that can move through walls. Likewise, other
solid objects cannot move through them.
Rule 2: Objects are bounded so that they do not break up and then come back together again.
This rule helps to distinguish between solid objects and gloop such as applesauce or liquids.
Rule 3: Objects move on continuous paths so that they cannot teleport from one part of the
room to another part without being seen crossing in between.
Rule 4: Objects generally only move when something else makes them move by force or
collision. Otherwise, they are likely to be living things…
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As we shall see later, Spelke’s rules are remarkable to someone familiar with quantum
mechanics because they are almost exactly the opposite of the phenomena we observe in the
quantum realm.
Many cognitive biases, including those detailed by Spelke, persist into adulthood, yet most
naïve physical beliefs are also modified over time: an adult viewing Hood’s gravity error
experiments would most likely pick the pocket located at the end of the tube, not directly
under the original hole. It seems that humans can consciously overcome our inbuilt laws of
physics, but much evidence shows that at the core there still remains the four fundamental
beliefs espoused by Spelke [18]. Most grown adults would heartily agree that objects do not go
in and out of existence, are not shattered only to reconfigure perfectly, do not have invisible
teleportation abilities, and only move when acted upon. Indeed, appearances violating these
beliefs, such as disappearing rabbits and levitating tables, are usually regarded as magical [17].
Quantum Mechanics is Spooky
Over the last two-hundred years quantum mechanics has developed into a rich, beautiful and
compelling theory. However, the way physical objects behave in the quantum realm is very
different both from what we observe in every day experience and from our naïve
understanding of physics. Taking Spelke’s rules of innate object knowledge and comparing
them to quantum mechanical phenomena, we see stark differences:
Rule 1: Objects do not go in and out of existence like the Cheshire Cat in Alice in Wonderland.
Their solidity dictates that they are not phantoms that can move through walls. Likewise, other
solid objects cannot move through them.
In quantum mechanics, particles can appear to go in and out of existence! Quantum mechanics
predicts that all around us and all the time particles called virtual particles and constantly
popping in and out of existence [19]. Interestingly enough, Timothy Ferris independently
referred to these unintuitive quantum mechanical results as “Alice-in-Wonderland oddities”
[20].
Similarly, particles can move through walls. Classically, when particles collide with a barrier,
with not enough energy to burst through, they bounce back – they reflect; yet in quantum
mechanics, sometimes particles with not enough energy to overcome a barrier still make it
through via a process known as quantum tunneling, see figure 2.
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Figure 1. Quantum tunneling through a barrier.
Rule 2: Objects are bounded so that they do not break up and then come back together again.
This rule helps to distinguish between solid objects and gloop such as applesauce or liquids.

When a single photon hits a half-silvered mirror, see figure 2, intuition would say that
the photon randomly leaves the mirror in either the vertical or horizontal
direction. The photon would then bounce off one of the mirrors and then hit the halfsilvered mirror just before the detectors. At the second half-slivered mirror one would
again expect the photon to randomly leave in either the vertical or horizontal direction
and thus we should detect half the photons at detector A and half the photons at
detector B.
However, when we perform these experiments, we observe 100% of the photons
arriving at detector A and none at detector B. This effect is known as one-particle
interference. Even when only a single photon is sent through the apparatus, it appears
as if the photons splits, travels along both paths, and comes back together again to
interfere with itself.
If we choose to observe the path the photon travels along, we do indeed only see it
traveling along one path, as one would expect, but interestingly the interference effect
no longer occurs; we see equal amounts of photons arrive at both detectors. The oneparticle interference effect only happens when we’re not looking. Strangely, this
choice to look or not can be made after the photon has completed its journey through
the apparatus with the same effect [21, 22].
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Figure 2. Photon seems to split apart and travel along both paths.
Rule 3: Objects move on continuous paths so that they cannot teleport from one part of the
room to another part without being seen crossing in between.
In quantum mechanics, particles can teleport from one location to another without crossing in
between. For example, if a particle is constrained to be within a box with walls that are
impenetrable barriers (so it can’t tunnel out), then there are certain states where a particle can
be observed on the left hand side of the box and on the right hand side of the box but never in
the middle. Sometimes when you look, you see the particle on the left hand side of the box;
sometimes when you look, you see the particle on the right hand side of the box; but you will
never observe the particle in the middle travelling from one side to the other as our intuition
demands, see figure 3.

Figure 3. Particle in a Box. The probability of finding the particle in the middle is zero.
Rule 4: Objects generally only move when something else makes them move by force or
collision. Otherwise, they are likely to be living things…
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In quantum mechanics, all particles, even those that are in the state of lowest possible energy
— ground state — still have a zero-point energy. This underlying energy causes all particles to
be in constant motion without being acted upon by external forces or collisions, even at
absolute zero.
As we can see, quantum phenomena do not just go against everyday experience, they go
against our inbuilt cognitive modules. This not only makes quantum mechanics difficult to
comprehend but also difficult to accept. For those trained in quantum mechanics, it is even
worse. The Copenhagen interpretation postulates that not only are the results of quantum
mechanics non-local but that reality itself is non-local. Feynman summed this up by saying “…
the ‘paradox’ is only a conflict between reality and your feeling of what reality ‘ought to be’.”
[23]
Other quantum phenomena that seem fantastical and do not match our intuition include:
The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle: The Heisenberg uncertainty principle states that it is
impossible to know the precise location and speed (momentum) of a particle at the same time.
It is this indeterminism within nature, especially as interpreted using the Copenhagen
interpretation, which Einstein at first refused to accept when he famously stated that
“Quantum mechanics is certainly imposing. But an inner voice tells me that it is not yet the real
thing. The theory says a lot, but does not really bring us any closer to the secret of the old one.
I, at any rate, am convinced that He does not throw dice.” [24]
Quantum Entanglement: Quantum entanglement occurs when two particles interact in a way
that cannot be described independently. Measurement of a property of one of the particles
affects the state of the other particle, which at the time of measurement may be separated by a
large distance. Again, this quantum mechanical effect goes against our intuition and appears
magical, inspiring Einstein to call it “spooky action at a distance.” [25]
Wave Particle Duality: In quantum mechanics particles can behave both as particles and as
waves. As we saw with one-particle interference the way they act seems to depend entirely on
if we are watching them or not. Another example where this occurs is in the double slit
experiment where particles are fired at a diffraction grating through which they diffract – acting
like waves. However, if we observe the particles as they go through the barrier, they behave
exactly as we would expect — i.e. like particles. Wave-particle duality was described by
Feynman as the quantum “mystery which cannot go away.” [26]
Conclusion
As we have seen, naïve theories of physics can result in incorrect notions about how the world
works; and everyone, including physicists, possess these biases that can constrain true
objectivity when evaluating scientific explanations [27]. These biases can result in some
scientific theories suffering from bias neglect, whereby incorrect interpretations of scientific
results appear to be objective conclusions. When operating unconsciously under biases, both
7

learned and innate, scientists often draw satisfying conclusions but “robustly fail to appreciate
that they should also be more skeptical of such [gratifying] results.” [28]
We have illustrated how quantum mechanics, and more specifically the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics, violates our innate understanding of how the world
should work, see table 1. It is our argument, that to satisfy our innate beliefs, many physicists
have chosen to support the minimally counter-intuitive and cognitively optimal [29, 30] manyworlds interpretation. In doing so, they do not have to deal with wave-function collapse or the
underlying counter-intuitive non-locality that the Copenhagen interpretation espouses.

Core Object Knowledge

Quantum Mechanics

Objects do not go in and out of existence.
Objects do not break up and then come back
together again.
Objects cannot teleport from one part of the
room to another part without being seen
crossing in between.
Objects only move when something else
makes them move.

Particles do go in and out of existence.
Particles do break up and then come back
together again.
Particles can teleport from one part of the
room to another part without being seen
crossing in between.
Particles are in constant motion

Table 1. Spelke’s Core Object Knowledge and Quantum Mechanics
When determining how to interpret quantum mechanics, physicists should be cognizant of
inherent cognitive biases. Otherwise they may adhere to the minimally counter-intuitive manyworlds interpretation as a results of such biases. In fact, we posit that some physicists are
biased toward the many-world interpretation exactly because of their cognitive bias arising
from their core object knowledge in their naïve physics cognitive module. This partiality does
not necessarily mean that these physicists are incorrect; they are simply biased.
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